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RECENT CASES
RECENT CASES
AUTOMOBILES--BANKRUPTCY-VALIDITY OF PROVISIONS IN
MOTOR VEHICLES FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY ACTS DENY-
ING EFFECT TO DISCHARGES IN BANKRUPTCY.-A judgment
had been obtained against plaintiff for negligently operating an auto-
mobile. After obtaining a discharge in bankruptcy, he applied for a
driver's license. The Michigan Secretary of State refused the applica-
tion, relying on a Michigan statute which provides, "A discharge in
bankruptcy following the rendering of any such judgment shall not
relieve the judgment debtor from any of the requirements" of the
Motor Vehicles Financial Responsibility Act.' Plaintiff, applying for
a writ of mandamus, contended the act was unconstitutional as an
attempt to alter the Federal Bankruptcy Act.' It was held that the
writ would not be granted. The discharge in bankruptcy did not end
plaintiff's moral obligation to pay, and the state could require fulfill-
ment of the moral obligation as a condition precedent to granting the
license by virtue of its inherent power to regulate the use of the
public highways.! De Vries v. Alger, 329 Mich. 68, 44 N.W.2d 872
(1950).
Earlier cases reached a contrary result,' holding that a state has
no power to make exceptions to the operation of a discharge in bank-
ruptcy. However, in 1941 the Supreme Court of the United States,
four justices dissenting, held that such a provision was a valid means
of enforcing a public policy aimed at eliminating financially irrespon-
sible drivers from the highways, and thus not in derogation of the
Bankruptcy Act.' This appears to be the sole exception which the
courts have been willing to make to the operation of a discharge in
bankruptcy. The usual result in such situations is illustrated by
an early case' holding that a municipality which had enacted an
ordinance allowing discharge of employees for failure to pay debts
could not discharge a fireman who had obtained a discharge in
1 Mich. Pub. Acts, No. 300, § 513 (1949).
11 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq.
Accord, Munz v. Harnett, 6 F. Supp. 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1933) (discharge in
bankruptcy is not satisfaction of a judgment, but only bars the creditor's
remedies for collection) (statute specifically provided that discharge in
bankruptcy should not satisfy judgment).
4 In re Perkins, 3 F. Supp. 697 (N.D. N.Y. 1933) (denying plaintiff full
effect of discharge in bankruptcy was in conflict with Bankruptcy Act,
thus invalid) (discussed in 43 Yale LJ. 344); Ellis v. Rudy, 171 Md. 280,
289 Ad. 281 (1937) (not legislative intent to apply the law to judgment
debtors who had been discharged in bankruptcy).
Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33 (1941) (due process not violated if state
gives a plaintiff an additional means of enforcing payment of a judgment
by dealing with the license and registration of the driver).
6 In re Hicks, 133 Fed. 739 (N.D.N.Y. 1905).
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bankruptcy. Statutes of the type found in the instant case' are
subject to the criticism that, standing alone, they fail to give protec-
tion to the judgment creditor who has already been injured. North
Dakota meets this situation by allowing recourse to an unsatisfied
judgment fund when the judgment debtor has no resources with
which to pay, and the judgment is more than $300.00 and less than
$10,000.00.' Massachusetts has met the situation by requiring com-
pulsory liability insurance of all drivers.9 This method, however, is
open to the objection that it amounts to a subsidization of insurance
companies or represents an instance of the state itself going into the
insurance business. Nevertheless, it would appear that the require-
ment of compulsory liability insurance offers greater protection, at
least in the case of residents of the state, than an unsatisfied judg-
ment fund, since there is no minimum amount which is not covered.
Veloyce G. Winslow.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-POLICE POWER OF MUNICIPALITY-
VALIDITY OF ORDINANCE DECLARING DOOR-TO-DOOR SOLI-
CITING A NUISANCE-Appellant, representing a national magazine
subscription company in charge of a crew of solicitors, was sentenced
and fined by appellee city for violation of a city ordinance declaring
that the going in and upon private residences within the city by
solicitors, peddlers, hawkers, itinerant merchants or transient vendors
of merchandise without request or invitation, for the soliciting of
orders or sale or disposal of their merchandise to be a misdemeanor
and punishable as such. The Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the
conviction and fine, whereupon appellant attacked the constitution-
ality of the ordinance in the United States Supreme Court. In finding
the ordinance constitutional, over two dissents, the court held that it
was not violative of due process, commerce clause or freedom of
speech and press. While admitting that the knocker on the door is
an invitation or license to attempt an entry, the court decided that
frequent visits become a nuisance. Breard v. City of Alexandria, 71
S.Ct. 920 (1951).
Here involved is the ordinance commonly known in both lay and
legal circles as the Green River ordinance because of its origin in
Green River, Wyoming, in 1931. Its widespread adoption has produced
a sharp conflict between the local police power and persons engaged
in businesses which go directly to the prospective customer in his
home. It represents a phase of the municipal police power which
concededly is justified insofar as it relates to public health, morals,
N.D. Rev. Code c. 39-16 (Supp. 1949).
S N.D. Rev. Code c. 39-17 (Supp. 1949).
Mass. Gen. Laws c. 90 (Tercent. ed. 1932).
